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Over the past year, Pakistan has endured a series of traumatic events that have brought increasing 
stress to its people and its political classes, as well as to American policymakers and the international 
community.   
 
In March 2007 President Musharraf suspended the Supreme Court’s chief justice, a move which 
sparked a movement of lawyers and professionals in opposition to the government’s action.  In July, 
the army retook the Lal Masjid (“Red Mosque”) from militant groups in an assault that brought 
numerous casualties.  This led to the breakdown of a tenuous accord between the government and 
pro-Taliban groups in Waziristan, who resumed attacks on government forces—attacks that have 
expanded since into settled areas.   
 
In October, the opposition leader Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan to campaign in upcoming 
National Assembly elections; on the day of her return, an attempt was made on her life that killed 149 
others.  In November, President Musharraf declared a state of emergency that lasted six weeks, 
purged the Supreme Court, and put new controls on broadcast media.  Finally, in December Benazir 
Bhutto was killed, precipitating a new situation that seems to be moving—tortuously—toward new 
elections. 
 
In this fierce succession of events, it is important to not lose a broader perspective.  The Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan has gone through many crises in its 60 years, and its resilience has been often 
underestimated.  One source of this resilience has been, necessarily, the Pakistani public.  Thus it is 
vital to ask what are the strengths and weaknesses, the areas of agreement and polarization that 
characterize the public’s attitudes. 
 
Naturally a key concern, especially from an American perspective, is how Pakistanis view the proper 
role of Islam in society.  Central to the US “war on terror” is concern about militant groups, such as al 
Qaeda and the Taliban, who seek to create an extremely conservative and theocratic Islamist state.  
How responsive are Pakistanis to the siren song of such ideas?  The Pakistani government has taken a 
number of steps in recent years to reform the madrassahs and laws related to the treatment of women: 
how do Pakistanis view these developments?  
 
Conversely important is the question of how Pakistanis view democracy. How important is 
democracy to them and how do they assess the reality of democratic functioning in Pakistan?   
Likewise, how do they value the independence of the justice system, which has been sorely tested 
over the last year? 
 
Perhaps most centrally, does the majority feel there are contradictions between democratic 
governance and Islam’s social role, or do they see these as essentially in harmony?  Does the current 
political turmoil arise from deep-seated ideological conflicts on these questions, or do they primarily 
arise from political power struggles? 
 
The army has long taken the central role among Pakistan’s governmental institutions.  How do 
Pakistanis really feel about the army?  Is there a single view of the army held by a majority, whatever 
role the army takes—or do they see its many different roles in different ways? 
 
Over the last year the Taliban and other militant groups consolidated themselves in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and reached increasingly into the Northwest Frontier Province, 
much to the concern of the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan.  A key part of this 
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situation is the fact that the FATA is only loosely integrated with Pakistan as a whole.  How do 
Pakistanis view this longstanding arrangement? 
   
How do Pakistanis look on military action in FATA against Islamist militant groups?  When 
Pakistanis think about Islamist militancy, how do they perceive it?  How aware are they of these 
organizations’ actual methods and activities?  Do they think of such groups as a threat to Pakistan?  
 
The United States has made major investments in its relationship with Pakistan’s government and 
military.  The events of the last year have led to an American debate—likely to grow only more 
intense—over what direction the United States should take now.  Should the United States continue to 
focus on its relations with the governing elite?  Should it engage with Pakistan in a wider and perhaps 
riskier way, one that includes Pakistan’s people and civil society?  What do Pakistani public attitudes 
suggest about the prospects of different possible US courses of action? 
 
To seek answers to these and many other compelling questions, WorldPublicOpinion.org and the U.S. 
Institute of Peace collaborated on a far-ranging study of Pakistani public attitudes.  The survey was 
conducted from Sept. 12 to 18, just before President Pervez Musharraf declared a six-week state of 
emergency and before the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.  The sample 
included 907 Pakistani urban adults, selected using multi-stage probability sampling, who were 
interviewed at home in 19 cities.  The margin of error is +/- 3.3 percent. 
 
The key findings of the study are: 
 
1. Role of Islam 
There is strong public support for giving Islam a wider role in Pakistan.  A large majority feels it is 
very important to live in a country that is governed according to Islamic principles.  A majority says it 
would like to see Shari’a or Islamic law play a larger role in their country than it does today. 
 
At the same time, there is little support for a shift towards extreme religious conservatism.  Instead 
there is significant support for some reforms in the opposite direction.  Only a small minority—even 
among those who want a greater role for Shari’a—wants to see the “Talibanization” of daily life 
increase.  About two-thirds support a recent government plan to reform the madrassahs, including 
strong support among those favoring Shari’a.  A plurality supports the Women’s Protection Act, 
which modifies existing law in the direction of greater women’s rights. ...............................................5 
 
2. Views of Democracy 
A large majority of Pakistanis endorse democracy.  Most Pakistanis say it is very important to live in 
a country governed by elected representatives.  Among those who want a greater role for Islam, 
support for democracy is even higher than among the population as a whole.  Likewise, a large 
majority supports an independent judiciary. ...........................................................................................8 
 
3. Assessment of Pakistani Democracy  
Pakistanis are lukewarm about how well their government lives up to democratic principles.  A 
plurality is not confident that the next elections will be free and fair, and few think the courts are 
independent of political or military influence.  Assessments of Pakistan’s protection of human rights 
are also lukewarm. ..................................................................................................................................9 
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4. Views of the Government 
Majorities express little confidence in the national government’s political institutions including the 
president, the National Assembly, the Provincial Assemblies, and the police.  However, views are 
mixed about the Nazims and the justice system. .................................................................................. 10 
 
5. Views of the Military  
In sharp contrast to their negative views of many civilian institutions, Pakistanis express substantial 
confidence in the armed forces and give the army high ratings for performing traditional military 
functions.  However, when it comes to the army’s role in the ongoing governance of the country, 
views are complex.  While the army is seen as capable, few believe that it has a positive influence on 
Pakistan’s economy and politics.  A plurality says that the role of the army should be limited to 
military matters..................................................................................................................................... 11 
 
6. Islamist Militant Groups  
A large majority of Pakistanis have negative views of Islamist militant organizations such as al 
Qaeda, local Taliban, and Pakistani militant groups.  The activities of these groups are seen as threats 
to Pakistan and the use of violence against civilians is overwhelmingly rejected.  However, a majority 
also rejects the government’s recent military assault to retake the Red Mosque from Islamist 
extremists and their militant associates.  Awareness of Pakistani militant groups’ activities appears to 
be low: few perceive that their operations have targeted civilians, that they have relations with the 
Pakistani army and intelligence agencies, or that they provide social services.................................... 12 
 
7. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
A large majority of Pakistanis want to phase out the FATA’s special legal status and to integrate the 
areas into the country’s overall legal structure.  Few want this to happen abruptly, however; a 
plurality favors a gradualist approach.  Pakistanis strongly prefer negotiating with the Taliban rather 
than fighting them.  Only a small minority supports using military force to exert control while a 
plurality favors a negotiated approach.  The current policy of limited military action while pursuing 
negotiations with local forces receives plurality approval. 
 
A plurality believes the army should pursue and capture Taliban insurgents and al Qaeda forces 
crossing into Pakistan from Afghanistan.  But overwhelming majorities oppose allowing foreign 
forces to enter Pakistan in order to do so.  Almost no Pakistanis appear to believe Osama bin Laden is 
in Pakistan, and even if his location were to be established in the FATA, a plurality thinks the 
government should not try to capture him............................................................................................ 15 
 
8. Relations with the United States 
Majority opinion toward the United States is negative.  Large majorities say that the United States 
cannot be trusted to act responsibly and also believe that it has extraordinary influence over Pakistan.  
US military presence in the region is viewed as a threat to Pakistan.  A large and growing majority 
believe it is a US goal to weaken and divide the Muslim world.  A plurality disapproves of how 
Pakistan’s government has handled relations with the United States. Only one in four feels that 
security cooperation with the United States has brought Pakistan any benefit. ................................... 18 
 
9. Relations with Afghanistan 
Majorities see the tensions with Afghanistan as a threat to Pakistan’s interests and approve of the way 
Pakistan’s government has handled relations with its neighbor.  Views of the Taliban’s activities in 
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Afghanistan are quite mixed: nearly half show at least some sympathy for their attacks on NATO 
troops, while one in three show some sympathy for Taliban attacks on Afghan police and troops.  
Only one in three believe that the Pakistani government is seriously trying to prevent the Taliban 
from operating in Afghanistan. .............................................................................................................20 
 
10. Ranking of Perceived Threats 
Asked to evaluate a series of possible threats to Pakistan’s vital interests, the Pakistani public rates 
US military presence in the region as a critical threat by the largest percentage.  Other threats 
regarded as critical by majorities include tensions with India and violence between Pakistani religious 
and ethnic groups.  Slightly fewer regard the activities of al Qaeda, local Taliban, and jihadist 
militants as critical, or the activities of ethnic nationalist movements.  Only half see the possibility of 
Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as threatening.  A majority considers the rise of China to be no threat 
to Pakistan.............................................................................................................................................22 
 
11. Trade and Globalization  
Large majorities endorse international trade and see it as beneficial for Pakistan, though only a 
plurality are positive about the idea of globalization. ...........................................................................23 
 
12. Pakistan’s Economy  
Two thirds feel that Pakistan’s economy has gone off on the wrong track.  Nonetheless, a majority 
approves of how the government is handling the economy..................................................................24 
 
13. Education 
Majorities express confidence in the educational system and approve of the government’s policies.  
Pakistanis put the highest priorities on teaching children religious values and good citizenship, 
followed by basic skills, problem-solving, and independent thinking..................................................24
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1. Role of Islam 
There is strong public support for giving Islam a wider role in Pakistan.  A large majority feels 
it is very important to live in a country that is governed according to Islamic principles.  A 
majority says it would like to see Shari’a or Islamic law play a larger role in their country than 
it does today. 
 
At the same time, there is little support for a shift towards extreme religious conservatism.  
Instead there is significant support for some reforms in the opposite direction.  Only a small 
minority—even among those who want a greater role for Shari’a—wants to see the 
“Talibanization” of daily life increase.  About two-thirds support a recent government plan to 
reform the madrassahs, including strong support among those favoring Shari’a.  A plurality 
supports the Women’s Protection Act, which modifies existing law in the direction of greater 
women’s rights. 
 
Support for a Greater Role for Islam 
 
Majorities of Pakistanis would like to 
see Islam playing a wider role in the 
public life of their country.  When 
asked to use a 10-point scale to rank 
the importance of living “in a country 
that is governed according to Islamic 
principles,” 61 percent picked 10 
(meaning “absolutely important”), and 
81 percent chose 8 or higher.  Only a 
miniscule 4 percent said 4 or less.  
The mean response was 9.0. 
 
Respondents were then asked to use 
another 10-point scale to rank how 
much Pakistan is currently governed 
by Islamic principles, with 0 meaning 
“not at all” and 10 meaning 
“completely.”  This time 61 percent 
picked scores of 5 or less.  Only 17 
percent answered 8 or higher.  The 
mean score was just 4.6. 
 
A clear majority thinks that Shari’a 
should play a more important role in 
Pakistan. Asked whether “Shari’a 
should play a larger role, a smaller 
role, or about the same role” 
compared to current Pakistani law, 60 
percent said a larger role.  Only 11 
percent thought the role of Shari’a 
Shari’a’s Role in Law
As compared to current Pakistan law, do you think that 
Shari’a should play a larger role, a smaller role, or about the 
same role in Pakistan law as it plays today?
WPO 9/07
A larger role





ri’ ’s l  i  
s co pared to current Pakistan la , do you think that 
Shari’a should play a larger role, a s aller role, or about the 
sa e role in Pakistan la  as it plays today?
PO 9/07
 larger role
bout the sa e role it plays today












How important is it for you to live in a country that is 
governed according to Islamic principles? 
And how much do you think Pakistan is governed according 
to Islamic principles?












o  i portant is it for you to live in a country that is 
governed according to Isla ic principles? 
nd ho  uch do you think Pakistan is governed according 
to Isla ic principles?
r t  Isl i  ri i l s
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should be smaller, and 15 percent thought it should stay the same. 
 
Pakistanis also consider Islam more vital to their identity than ethnicity or nationality.  The survey 
asked respondents to choose which of five identities—Pakistani, Muslim, individual, citizen of the 
world, member of your ethnic group—was “most central to your sense of self or identity.” Sixty-one 
percent said being a Muslim was the most central (another 31 percent said this was their second 
choice.)  The next most popular was, being Pakistani, which was the first choice of 29 percent (56 
percent second choice). 
 
Asked about the “secularization of daily life,” only 13 percent said they would like to see more, while 
69 percent expressed opposition.  A striking 52 percent refused to answer the question as posed and 
volunteered that that there should be no secularization at all.  Another 17 percent said they would like 
to see secularization decrease. 
 
The question of Islam having a greater role does not appear to be a divisive issue—rather, support 
cuts across key political lines.  Support for a greater role for Islam extends to supporters of all of the 
major Pakistani leaders, including Pervez Musharraf.  Respondents were asked who they thought was 
best to lead Pakistan (Benazir Bhutto was the most popular at 27 percent while Musharraf and Nawaz 
Sharif were tied at 21 percent).  Though there was some variation, supporters of all leaders mostly 
favored a greater role for Islam and Shari’a and opposed increased secularization.  Mean ratings for 
the importance of Pakistan being governed by Islamic principles were approximately 9 (on a 0-10 
scale) for all groups.  Those favoring a larger role for Shari’a varied only slightly: 55 percent among 
Musharraf supporters, 62 percent among Sharif supporters.  Interestingly, opposition to secularization 
was highest among Musharraf supporters (76%), followed by Sharif supporters (68%) and Bhutto 
supporters (63%). 
 
Rejection of Extreme Religious Conservatism 
 
A number of poll questions revealed that the Pakistani public’s support for Islam playing a larger role 
in their country does not signify support for extreme religious conservatism.  Majorities of all 
Pakistanis—even majorities of those who favor a greater role for Shari’a—oppose an increase in 
Talibanization and support reforming structures of a conservative character dating from the time of 
General Zia 
 
Respondents were asked about the 
“Talibanization of daily life,” a term 
widely used by Pakistani media at the 
time of the poll, which is generally 
understood to signify extreme 
religious conservatism and even 
militancy.  Just 15 percent said they 
would like to see this increase (11% 
“a little,” and only 4% “a great 
deal”).  Fifty-nine percent expressed 
opposition:  A plurality (38%) said 
that such “Talibanization” should 
decrease (20% a great deal) and 21 
percent said it should stay about the 
same. 
Talibanization
Would you like to see the Talibanization of daily life in 
Pakistan increase, decrease, or stay about the same? 
WPO 9/07
A great deal / A little









ould you like to see the Talibanization of daily life in 
Pakistan increase, decrease, or stay about the sa e? 
PO 9/07
 great deal /  little
Stay about the sa e
Increase:
 great deal /  little
ecrease:
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rcent were opposed. 
Interestingly, support for Talibanization was no greater among those wanting a greater role for 
Shari’a. 
 
Perhaps the most important 
indication that Pakistanis have little 
interest in extreme religious 
conservatism is their strong majority 
support for a recent government plan 
to regulate the madrassahs, or Islamic 
schools.  About two-thirds (64%) 
said they would support a plan 
requiring “madrassahs to register 
with the government and to spend 
more time in class on subjects like 
mathematics and science.”  This 
included one third (36%) who said 
they strongly supported the plan.  
Only 17 percent opposed such 
reforms. Interestingly, those who 
wanted a larger role for Shari’a were 
slightly more likely than others to strongly favor these reforms: 40 percent favored them strongly and 
only 16 pe
Madrassah Reform Plan
As you may know, the government has proposed a plan to 
reform the madrassahs.  This plan would require madrassas to 
register with the government and to spend more time in class 










r ss f r  l
s you ay kno , the govern ent has proposed a plan to 
refor  the adrassahs.  This plan ould require adrassas to 
register ith the govern ent and to spend ore ti e in class 




ppose strongly / ppose so e hat
Favor so e hat
 
Another indication of majority disinterest in extreme religious conservatism is Pakistani reaction to 
the government’s Women’s Protection Act, which made the laws on adultery and rape from the Zia 
period (the Hudood Ordinances) less harsh for women.  A 38 percent plurality—and a clear majority 
of those who answered—supported the Women’s Protection Act while only 27 percent opposed it.  
Another 16 percent volunteered they had not heard of the Act and 19 percent declined to answer. 
 
Pakistanis overwhelmingly reject the attacks on religious minorities carried out by some extreme 
fundamentalist groups in Pakistan as part of an ideology that demonizes such minorities.  Three 
quarters (75-78 percent) said that attacks on specific religious minorities (Shi’a and Ahmadiyya) were 
never justified.   Only 5-8 percent said protection of minorities was not important or that such attacks 
were sometimes justified. 
 
Four out of five (81%) also say it is “important for the unity of Pakistan to protect religious minorities 
in Pakistan” A large majority perceives that “religious minorities get such protection” either “almost 
always” (38%) or “most of the time” (31%).  Twenty-one percent believe minorities are protected 
only “some of the time” (15%) or “hardly ever” (6%). 
 
Why do Pakistanis say they want more Shari’a even though they resist extreme religious 
conservatism and support reforming certain Islamic laws?  It is important to note that Pakistan was 
founded as an Islamic republic and second that Shari’a has been part of the court system since the 
1970s, when it was introduced under General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq. Thus when Pakistanis say they 
want Shari’a to play a greater role, they may be expressing a desire for the system to work better, not 
for fundamental change.  They may simply want government officials to show more wisdom and 
piety or want their courts (known for long delays) to operate more efficiently. 
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2. Views of Democracy 
A large majority of Pakistanis endorse democracy.  Most Pakistanis say it is very important to 
live in a country governed by elected representatives.  Among those who want a greater role for 
Islam, support for democracy is even higher than among the population as a whole.  Likewise, a 
large majority supports an independent judiciary.   
 
Most Pakistanis want their 
government to be democratic.  Asked 
to assess, on a 10-point scale, “How 
important is it for you to live in a 
country that is governed by 
representatives elected by the 
people,” a large majority indicated 
that it was very important, choosing 8 
or higher, and 50 percent chose 10, 
meaning “absolutely important.”  The 
mean score was 8.4.  Only 7 percent 
chose a score of 3 or lower. 
 
Interestingly, those who wanted a 
larger role for Islam had an 
exceptionally strong desire for 
greater democracy.  Among the 60 
percent majority who support a larger role for Shari’a compared to current Pakistani law, 64 percent 
give the importance of democracy a 10; among those who want the role of Shar’ia to decrease or stay 
the same, only a quarter (25-26 percent) give the importance of democracy a 10.  Similarly, among 
the 31 percent for whom it is extremely important to live in a country governed by Islamic principles, 
and who give Pakistan a low rating in this regard, 72 percent give the importance of democracy a 
10—22 points higher than the full sa
How important is it for you to live in a country that is 
governed by representatives elected by the people? On this 
scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means 




Importance of Living in a Democracy
1-3 4-7 8-10
7 17 71
o  i portant is it for you to live in a country that is 
governed by representatives elected by the people? n this 
scale here 1 eans it is “not at all i portant” and 10 eans 




I rt  f i i  i   r
1-3 4-7 8-10
 
Pakistanis also consider it very 
important to “live in a country where 
the decisions of the courts are 
independent from influence by 
political and military authorities.”  
Asked to assess the importance of 
this on the 10-point scale, a large 
majority (71%) chose a score of 8 or 
higher.  The mean score was 8.6.  
Only a tiny minority (3%) considered 
this unimportant, giving it a score of 
less than
 
Support for democracy and an 
independent judiciary is also very 
strong among supporters of all the 
various Pakistani leaders.  Those saying democracy was important varied only moderately from a 
mean of 8.1 out of 10 among Sharif supporters to 8.6 among Musharraf supporters (Bhutto 
supporters, 8.4), while those favoring an independent judiciary varied even less, at 8.4 among Sharif 
supporters and 8.6 among Bhutto and Musharraf supporters. 
How important is it for you to live in a country where the 
decisions of the courts are independent from influence by 
political and military authorities?  On this scale where 1 
means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely 




Importance of Independent Judiciary
1-3 4-7 8-10
3 17 71
o  i portant is it for you to live in a country here the 
decisions of the courts are independent fro  influence by 
political and ilitary authorities?  n this scale here 1 
eans it is “not at all i portant” and 10 eans “absolutely 




I rt  f I t J i i r
1-3 4-7 8-10
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Benazir Bhutto.  
3. Assessment of Pakistani Democracy  
Pakistanis are lukewarm about how well their government lives up to democratic principles.  A 
plurality is not confident that the next elections will be free and fair, and few think the courts 
are independent of political or military influence.  Assessments of Pakistan’s protection of 
human rights are also lukewarm.  
 
When asked to assess, on a 10-point 
scale, “how much do you think 
Pakistan is governed by 
representatives elected by the 
people,” with 1 meaning “not at all” 
and 10 meaning “completely,” the 
mean response was 4.8.  Thirty-two 
percent gave a score of 3 or lower.  
Only 18 percent said Pakistan rated 
an eight out of 10 or higher.    Polling 
was conducted before Pakistani 
president and army chief Pervez 
Musharraf declared a state of 
emergency on Nov. 3.  It also took 
place before the Dec. 27 
assassination of former Prime 
Minister 
How much do you think Pakistan is governed by 
representatives elected by the people? …using a scale from 1 





Assessment of Pakistani Democracy
 
Pakistanis show skepticism about the quality of elections in their own country. Asked how confident 
they were that the upcoming elections would be “free and fair,” only 39 percent said they were either 
somewhat (28%) or very confident (11%), while a plurality of 44 percent said they were not very 
confident (27%) or not at all confident (17%). Nonetheless, a majority of Pakistanis (60%) said they 
thought there would be elections in 2007, though this was still an open question at the time of the 
poll.  Only 17 percent said they thought there would not be a vote, while 23 percent would not 
answer. 
 
Relatively few think their own 
country is fulfilling the ideal of an 
independent judiciary.  Asked to use 
a 10-point scale to assess how much 
“the decisions of the courts are 
independent from influence by 
political and military authorities” 
(with 1 meaning “not at all” and 10 
meaning “completely”), only 26 
percent gave their country a score of 
8 or higher while nearly as many 
(23%) gave it a score of three or 
lower. The mean score was 5.6.  
 
Similarly, few Pakistanis think their 
country consistently protects human 





 uch do you think Pakistan is governed by 
resentatives elected by the people? using a scale fro  1 





ss ss t f ist i r
1-3 4-7 8-10
How much do you think that in Pakistan, the decisions of the 
courts are independent from influence by political and 
military authorities…using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 




Assessment of Judicial Independence
1-3 4-7 8-10
23 40 26
o  uch do you think that in Pakistan, the decisions of the 
courts are independent fro  influence by political and 
ilitary authorities using a scale fro  1 to 10, here 1 




ss ss t f J i i l I
1-3 4-7 8-10
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eat deal (8%).   
that there was “a lot of respect for individual human rights in our country.  Another fourth (26%) said 
there was “some respect.”  Forty-two percent said there was either “not much respect” (21%) or “no 
respect at all” (21%). 
 
4. Views of the Government 
Majorities express little confidence in the national government’s political institutions including 
the president, the National Assembly, the Provincial Assemblies, and the police.  However, 
views are mixed about the Nazims and the justice system.    
 
Asked about national institutions—the government as a whole, the president and the legislature—
strong majorities in Pakistan express little or no confidence.  Two out of five Pakistanis (59%) said 
either that they did not have very much faith in their “national government as a whole” (48%) or that 
they had none (11%).  Only a third (33%) said they had “quite a lot” (25%) or a “great deal” (8%) of 
confidence.  
 
There was a similar lack of 
confidence in the “office of the 
president.”  Fifty-five percent had 
either little (42%) or no confidence 
(13%) while only 30 percent had quite 
a lot (22%) or a gr
 
The National Assembly scored even 
lower. Fifty-nine percent had little 
(45%) or no confidence (14%) while 
29 percent had quite a lot (23%) or a 
great deal (6%). The same was true of 
the Provincial Assemblies: 58 percent 
had little (44%) or no confidence 
(14%) in them, while 29 percent had 
quite a lot (23%) or a great deal (6%). 
 
The police received the worst ratings.   
Two-thirds of those polled said they 
had either not very much (53%) or no 
confidence (13%) in the local police. 
 
Local governments, such as Nazims, 
at least garnered a divided assessment.  
The Nazims, local administrators 
(akin perhaps to mayors) who came 
into being under President 
Musharraf’s Devolution of Power 
Plan of August 2000, run for election 
on a non-party basis. Less than half of 
those polled (47%) showed little 
(37%) or no confidence (10%) in local authorities, while nearly as many (44%) said they had quite a 
lot (30%) or a great deal (14%) of confidence.  
The National Government as a whole
Confidence in Institutions
For each of the following institutions, how much confidence 
do you have that they are serving the interests of the people 
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Pakistani views of their country’s justice system are also mixed:  Nearly half (47%) expressed little 
(37%) or no confidence (10%), almost as many (43%) expressed quite a lot of confidence (30%) or a 
great deal (13%).  
Another question asked respondents where they would turn if they were the victims of a crime, giving 
them a range of formal, traditional or religious options:  “If someone in your family suffered from a 
serious crime, which of the following would you have the most confidence to effectively deal with it 
in the right way?”   
 
“The courts” was the most popular response, but only 34 percent chose it.  Next came “my family or 
clan” (25%), followed by “the local police” (14%).  Very few—only 9 percent—selected any of the 
religious or semi-religious authority offered (“a local religious leader,” 2%; “a jirga,” 2%; “a 
panchayat,” 2%; “a mohalla committee,” 3%).   
 
This suggests that for many Pakistanis, formal means of justice (police and courts) are seen as the 
primary source of redress. However, for important minorities, traditional forms of justice (including 
family and clan and other local religious and cultural institutions) remain appealing.  
 
Pakistani attitudes about public officials do not seem to reflect personal experience with corruption.  
An overwhelming 88 percent of those polled answered “No,” when asked “have you or someone in 
your family been personally affected by an act of corruption by government officials in the past 12 
months.”  Only 3 percent said they had been affected by corruption. 
 
5. Views of the Military  
In sharp contrast to their negative views of many civilian institutions, Pakistanis express 
substantial confidence in the armed forces and give the army high ratings for performing 
traditional military functions.  However, when it comes to the army’s role in the ongoing 
governance of the country, views are complex.  While the army is seen as capable, few believe 
that it has a positive influence on Pakistan’s economy and politics.  A plurality says that the role 
of the army should be limited to military matters.  
 
Although they exhibit little trust in many government institutions, a majority of Pakistanis express 
confidence in the military.  Two-thirds said they had either a great deal (34%) or quite a lot (35%) of 
confidence in the army and other armed forces.  Only a quarter said they had not very much (18%) or 
no confidence (5%). 
 
This approval is especially high when 
Pakistanis are asked about the 
military’s performance of traditional 
military functions. More than four out 
of five (84%) said the Pakistani army 
was doing either an “excellent” (56%) 
or a good job (28%) “defending 
Pakistan’s borders and territory.”  
Only 12 percent said its performance 
was fair or poor.   
Defending Pakistan’s borders and territory
Performance of the Army





Helping with economic growth and development
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Taking part in ho  Pakistan is governed
 
When asked to evaluate the army’s 
role in the governance of Pakistan, 
views are complex.  Asked to rate the 
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army’s performance in “how Pakistan is governed”, a modest majority (53%) considered military 
participation in governance to be excellent (25%) or good (28%).  But large numbers (36%) thought 
that the army’s role in governing their country was either only fair (21%) or poor (15%).  Two out of 
three (66%) also said the army did an excellent (31%) or good (35%) job of “helping with economic 
growth and development,” while 28 percent said these efforts were fair (22%) or poor (6%).  
 
But though the army is seen as capable, there is little enthusiasm for the impact of the army on 
political and economic aspects of the country.  Less than a quarter viewed that army as having a 
“mostly positive” influence on Pakistan’s economy, justice system, education and the rule of law, 
with more or equal numbers choosing “mostly negative.” For each question in the series, 45 percent 
or more of the respondents either declined to answer or volunteered other responses (“both,” 
“neither,” “it depends”). 
 
Only one in four (23%) called the army’s influence on the economy mostly positive while one in 
three (32%) called it negative.  Pakistani assessments of the army’s influence on the justice system 
were even less favorable: just 17 percent said positive while 27 percent said negative.  About the 
same number said the army’s influence on the constitution and rule of law was positive (18%), while 
one fourth (24%) had a negative view.  Less than one in four rated the army’s influence on the public 
education system as mostly positive (23%) and just as many rated it mostly negative (23%).  About 
one in five considered the army’s influence on the press, radio and television to be positive (21%) 
while one in four called it negative (26%). 
 
The highest percentage of “mostly positive’’ responses (29%) concerned the army’s influence on 
“national reconstruction, as instituted by the National Reconstruction Bureau,” an entity established 
by General Musharraf in November 1999, just one month after his military coup, to formulate policies 
for national reconstruction, promote good governance and strengthen democratic institutions.  Only 
19 percent considered the military’s influence on the Bureau to be mostly negative. 
 
A plurality of Pakistanis believe that “as a general rule” the armed forces should “be limited to strictly 
military matters,” rejecting the idea that they should “take a wider role in the country’s affairs.”  
Forty-one percent said the armed forces should handle only military matters, compared with 33 
percent who favored a wider role.  
 
6. Islamist Militant Groups  
A large majority of Pakistanis have negative views of Islamist militant organizations such as al 
Qaeda, local Taliban, and Pakistani militant groups.  The activities of these groups are seen as 
threats to Pakistan and the use of violence against civilians is overwhelmingly rejected.  
However, a majority also rejects the government’s recent military assault to retake the Red 
Mosque from Islamist extremists and their militant associates.  Awareness of Pakistani militant 
groups’ activities appears to be low: few perceive that their operations have targeted civilians, 
that they have relations with the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies, or that they provide 
social services.  
 
The degree to which militant groups find sympathy and resonance among the Pakistani public is a 
primary question for policymakers and analysts.    Pakistan’s ability to override Islamist militancy 
and strengthen democracy and the rule of law depends in large measure upon the Pakistani polity’s 
willingness to combat—militarily, politically and through law enforcement mechanisms—the various 
militant groups fighting in and from Pakistan.  Without such willingness, it is unclear whether 
Pakistan will be able to develop into a stable, democratic state at peace with itself and with its 
neighbors. 
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Large majorities of urban Pakistanis view the activities of al Qaeda, local Taliban, and Pakistani 
militant groups as threats to Pakistan’s vital interests.  Respondents were asked whether they saw the 
activities of these various groups “as a threat or not to the vital interests of Pakistan in the next ten 
years,” and, if so, whether they saw it “as a critical threat, or as important but not critical?” 
 
Sixty-two percent said al Qaeda’s 
activities threaten Pakistan, and 41 
percent saw this threat as critical.  
Only 14 percent thought al Qaeda 
was not a threat.  Sixty percent said 
the “activities of Islamist militants 
and local Taliban in FATA [the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas] 
and settled areas” threaten Pakistan, 
and 34 percent saw the threat as 
critical; 18 percent said these 
activities were not a threat.  Finally, 
61 percent thought the activities of 
domestic militant groups (askari 
tanzeems) were a threat to Pakistan, 
with 38 percent calling them a 
critical threat (17% said these were 
not a thre
Activities of Islamist militants and local Taliban in FATA and 
settled areas
Threat Assessment: Taliban, al Qaeda
Please tell me whether you see these activities as a threat OR 
NOT to the vital interests of Pakistan in the next ten years.
WPO 9/07
Critical Threat
Activities of al Qaeda
Not a threat
34 18
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Supporters of all the various Pakistani leaders view Islamist militant groups as threats to Pakistan. Al 
Qaeda was seen as a threat by 76 percent of Musharraf supporters, 60 percent of Bhutto supporters 
and 62 percent of Sharif supporters.  Similar perceptions were held for other Islamist militant groups. 
 
Rejection of Attacks on Civilians 
 
Substantial majorities also repudiate the tactic of attacks on civilians in general, including those 
directed against India by Pakistani extremist groups.  Respondents were asked: 
 
Some people think that 
bombing and other types of 
attacks intentionally aimed at 
civilians are sometimes 
justified while others think 
that this kind of violence is 
never justified. Do you 
personally feel that such 
attacks are often justified, 
sometimes justified, rarely 
justified, or never justified?   
Attacks on Civilians
Some people think that bombing and other types of attacks 
intentionally aimed at civilians are sometimes justified while 
others think that this kind of violence is never justified. Do 
you personally feel that such attacks are:
WPO 9/07
Often justified / Sometimes justified
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you personally feel that such attacks are:
PO 9/07
ften justified / So eti es justified
ever justified / Rarely justified
   
Two thirds (66%) said such attacks 
were either “never justified” (55%) 
or “rarely justified” (11%).  Only 15 
WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG / UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE                                                         13
       Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy,  
January 7, 2008             Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the US 
 
percent called such attacks “sometimes” (8%) or “often” (7%) justified.   
 
 Respondents were then asked whether specific types of attacks were sometimes or never justified.  
Sixty-four percent said “Attacks conducted against government institutions (like the national 
Parliament in Delhi and state assemblies)” were never justified while 15 percent said sometimes 
justified.  Sixty-seven percent said “attacks in India on families of Indian military personnel” were 
never justified while 13 percent said they were sometimes justified.  And 68 percent condemned 
“attacks conducted against Indian targets like subways, stock exchanges, and tourist sites” while only 
12 percent said these attacks were sometimes justified.   
 
Thus, only a minority of about 15 percent showed any support for the tactic of targeting civilians in 
general or in specific cases.   
 
Pakistan has long justified its support for militant groups battling India over Kashmir with the 
argument that because it was founded as the home for South Asia’s Muslims, Pakistan has an 
obligation to protect the Muslims of South Asia.  To determine whether Pakistanis believe their 
country has such an obligation to protect Muslims in Kashmir and elsewhere, respondents were asked 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: “Pakistan has a moral obligation to protect 
Muslims anywhere in South Asia.”  Sixty-six percent agreed (36% strongly); only 21 percent 
disagreed (13% strongly).   
 
Those who agreed were then asked: “To protect Muslims in South Asia, do you think Pakistan should 
use any means, including force, or do you think Pakistan should only use peaceful means?”  Fifty-one 
percent of the whole sample thought Pakistan should use only peaceful means; only 12 percent 
thought Pakistan should use any means, including force.  Thus overall, 72 percent rejected the idea 
that Pakistan should use force beyond its own territory in defense of Muslims. 
 
Attack on Red Mosque 
 
Pakistani perceptions of Islamist extremist and even militant groups as a threat does not translate 
necessarily into support for using military-style force against them, as in the Pakistani military’s 
attack on the Red Mosque or Lal Masjid in July.  The Red Mosque and its affiliated Jamia Hafsa 
seminary are Deobandi institutions situated in the heart of Islamabad that have been long associated 
with sectarian militant groups.  In recent years, the leadership of the Red Mosque and its seminary 
engaged in vigilante violence against such targets as women who chose not to wear the veil and stores 
selling music and movie CDs and DVDs. Throughout 2007, they confronted the Pakistani 
government by seizing state assets, kidnapping police officers and capturing purported prostitutes. 
The Pakistani government’s military offensive against the mosque and seminaries resulted in the 
death of the head cleric and a number of students.  The exact death toll remains controversial, with 
wildly varying estimates offered by government and non-government sources. 
 
When asked, “Do you think the Pakistani security forces should have used force to take over the Red 
Mosque, or do you think that this was a mistake?” nearly two out of three (64%) agreed that it was 
and only 22 percent disagreed.  Another question asked whether respondents approved of “the way 
Pakistan’s government is handling…religious extremism such as the Lal Masjid [Red Mosque].”  A 
majority disapproved (56%) while only 31 percent approved. 
 
Awareness of Activities of Militant Groups 
 
The Pakistani public does not appear to be very informed about the activities of Pakistani jihadist 
groups.  Few think that their operations have targeted civilians, that they have relations with the 
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Pakistani army and intelligence agencies, or that they provide social services to Pakistani 
communities.  
 
Pakistanis were asked about three militant groups that are known to have conducted operations in 
Kashmir—Jaish e Mohammad, Hizbol Mujahadeen, and Lashkar e Taiba. Respondents were asked 
whether each group “has intentionally targeted civilians in attacks” in Kashmir, or “has never 
intentionally targeted civilians?” In each case, about the same number—40 to 42 percent—said that 
the group “has never intentionally targeted civilians,” while a miniscule 6 percent said they had.  But 
a majority of respondents would not answer.  
 
Most observers of Pakistan agree that there are substantial linkages between militant groups that 
operate in Kashmir and India and the Pakistani army and intelligence services.  This study sought to 
learn whether Pakistanis believe that there is such a relationship and, if so, how close it is.   
 
Respondents were offered four options:  1) “no relationship;” 2) “some contacts;” 3) “some elements 
within the army and intelligence agencies provide support, such as money, training, advice and 
weapons;” and 4) “the army and intelligence services as a whole work closely with these groups.”  
One in four respondents said “there is no relationship at all.”  Another 24 percent chose an option 
indicating some relationship:  14 percent thought there were some contacts; 5 percent believed the 
army and intelligence provided support; and five percent thought the army and intelligence services 
worked closely with the militant groups.  About half (51%) did not provide an answer.   
 
These groups also claim that they that they provide social and community services in many parts of 
Pakistan.  To find out whether these services might influence Pakistani views, respondents were 
asked, “thinking about groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat ul Dawa, Hizbol Mujahadeen, and Jaish e 
Mohammad among other tanzeems, do you think they provide social and community services, or are 
these not part of their activities?”  Less than a quarter of Pakistanis believe that these services are 
even offered.  Only 23 percent said the groups provided such services; a plurality of 42 percent said 
they did not; and 35 percent did not answer. 
 
The 23 percent who said the groups offered some community services were then asked to name some 
of them.  Nearly all (22% of the whole sample) mentioned religious madaris (the plural of madrassah 
or religious school).  The next best-known services were humanitarian assistance during disasters 
(19%), medical care (16%), schools that do not primarily offer religious training (15%), and financial 
help with marriage and burials (11%). 
 
7. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
A large majority of Pakistanis want to phase out the FATA’s special legal status and to 
integrate the areas into the country’s overall legal structure.  Few want this to happen abruptly, 
however; a plurality favors a gradualist approach.  Pakistanis strongly prefer negotiating with 
the Taliban rather than fighting them.  Only a small minority supports using military force to 
exert control while a plurality favors a negotiated approach.  The current policy of limited 
military action while pursuing negotiations with local forces receives plurality approval.   
 
A plurality believes the army should pursue and capture Taliban insurgents and al Qaeda 
forces crossing into Pakistan from Afghanistan.  But overwhelming majorities oppose allowing 
foreign forces to enter Pakistan in order to do so.  Almost no Pakistanis appear to believe 
Osama bin Laden is in Pakistan, and even if his location were to be established in the FATA, a 
plurality thinks the government should not try to capture him. 
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A large majority favors the phasing out of the FATA’s special legal status and its integration into 
Pakistan’s legal structure.  Respondents were offered three statements about the FATA and asked 
which came closer to their own views.   
 
The least popular statement—chosen 
by only 8 percent—was that “the 
Frontier Crimes Regulation should be 
left unchanged.”  Instead 72 percent 
agreed that these regulations should 
be modified so that people in the 
FATA “have the same rights and 
responsibilities as all other 
Pakistanis.”  Only 26 percent thought 
that “the Frontier Crimes Regulation 
should be abolished.”  Instead 46 
percent said these regulations should 
be “modified slowly over time.”  
Thus although there is wide majority 
support for changing the FATA legal 
system, which was codified by the 
British in 1901, a plurality favors a 
gradualist approach. 
WPO 9/07
The Frontier Crimes Regulation should be left unchanged.
The Frontier Crimes Regulation should be modified slowly 
over time, such that eventually the people there should have 




The Frontier Crimes Regulation should be abolished, and the 
people there should have the same rights and responsibilities 
as all other Pakistanis.
Which of the following statements about FATA (Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas) comes closer to your view?
FATA’s Legal Status
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d inistered Tribal reas) co es closer to your vie ?
’s l t t s
 
Pakistanis express similar caution 
when asked about other approaches 
to dealing with militancy in the 
FATA.  Only 23 percent said that 
“Pakistan’s government should exert 
control over FATA, even if it means 
using military force to do so.”   The 
largest numbers (46%) say “the 
government should not try to exert 
control over FATA, but should try to 
keep the peace through negotiating 
deals with local Taliban.”  Another 
12 percent said the “government 
should withdraw its forces from 
FATA and leave the people alone.” 
WPO 9/07
Pakistan’s government should exert control over FATA, even 
if it means using military force to do so.
The government should not try to exert control over FATA 





The government should withdraw its forces from FATA and 
leave the people alone.
Which of the following statements about FATA (Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas) comes closer to your view?
FATA and Government Control
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A plurality approves of the way the government is handling the situation in the FATA, a policy 
combining limited use of military strikes and more extensive negotiations with local forces.  Forty-
eight percent approved of “the way Pakistan’s government is handling” the FATA (14% strongly), 
while 34 percent disapproved (12% strongly). 
 
Dealing With the Taliban and al Qaeda  
 
As discussed above, 60 percent saw “the activities of Islamist militants and local Taliban in FATA 
and settled areas” as a threat to Pakistan, and 34 percent regarded this threat as critical.  However, 
only a 48 percent plurality favored “allowing the Pakistani army to pursue and capture Taliban 
insurgents who have crossed over from Afghanistan,” while 34 percent were opposed.  The same 
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ity declined to 
enture a guess.   
ht the government should not attempt his capture; 
ly 24 percent thought the government should.  
pattern was evident when respondents were asked about al Qaeda using the FATA as a sanctuary.  A 
plurality (44%) favored “the Pakistani army entering federally administered tribal areas to pursue and 
capture al Qaeda fighters,” with 36 percent opposed.  
 
Taken together, these findings 
suggest considerable ambivalence 
among Pakistanis about the best way 
of handling the cross-border 
problems with Afghanistan.  There is 
overwhelming opposition to outside 
forces coming in to fight either the 
Taliban or al Qaeda, however. When 
asked “what about allowing foreign 
troops to pursue and capture Taliban 
insurgents who have crossed over 
into Afghanistan,” 77 percent thought 
the Pakistani government should not 
allow this, and only 9 percent 
disagreed.  Similarly, only a 
miniscule 5 percent thought “the 
Pakistani government should … 
allow American or other foreign 
troops to enter Pakistan to pursue and 
capture al Qaeda fighters,” while an 
overwhelming 80 percent opposed 
such foreign intervention.  
 
Almost no Pakistanis say they 
believe Osama bin Laden is in 
Pakistan, and even if authorities 
could establish his location in the 
FATA, a plurality thinks the 
government should not try to capture 
him.  Respondents were asked to 
guess bin Laden’s whereabouts: 
“Which do you think is more likely to be true: Osama bin Laden is somewhere in Pakistan; 
somewhere in Afghanistan; or in some other country?”  Only 2 percent said they thought he was in 
Pakistan, while 18 percent picked Afghanistan.  Thirteen percent supposed he was in some other 
country, and another 8 percent volunteered that he was in the United States.  A major
Pursuing Al Qaeda and the Taliban
What about allowing the Pakistani army to pursue and 





Do you favor or oppose the Pakistani army entering 






What about allowing foreign troops to pursue and capture 






Do you think the Pakistan government should or should not 
allow American or other foreign troops to enter Pakistan to 
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Next, respondents were asked to “suppose the Pakistani government learned that Osama bin Laden 
was in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and found his exact location.”  Even under 
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ur feels that security cooperation with the United States has brought Pakistan any 
percent who said 
ent thought events in Pakistan were 
 important 
 more attacks such as those on the World Trade Center in September 
8. Relations with the United States 
Majority opinion toward the United States is negative.  Large majorities say that the United 
States cannot be trusted to act responsibly and also believe that it has extraordinary influence 
over Pakistan.  US military presence in the region is viewed as a threat to Pakistan.  A large and 
growing majority believe it is a US goal to weaken and divide the Muslim world.  A plurality 




Pakistanis view the United States as 
an untrustworthy superpower.  A 
majority (64%) expressed doubt that 
the United States could be trusted “to 
act responsibly in the world,” 
including 49 percent who answered  
not at all” and 16 “
“not very much.”   
 
This mistrust is coupled with the 
perception that the United States is 
exerting extraordinary influence over 
what happens in Pakistan.  Asked to 
consider “recent major events 
happening in Pakistan,” a majority of 
respondents (56%) said that most 
(32%) or nearly all of these events 
24%) were controlled by the United States.  Only 26 perc
Lack of Trust in US to Act Responsibly
How much do you trust the following countries to act 
responsibly in the world…the US?
(
controlled some (22%) or very little (4%
 
Most Pakistanis believe the United 
States’ military presence in their 
region puts their country’s “vital 
interests” at risk.  Eighty-four percent 
said that the US military presence in 
Asia was either a “critical” (72%) or 
an “important” (12%) threat to 
Pakistan’s interests.  About as 
many—83 percent—said that the US 
presence in neighboring Afghanistan 
as a critical (68%) or
) by the United States. 
w
(15%) threat to Pakistan. 
 
A majority of Pakistanis give some 
credence America’s stated goal of 
defending itself from terrorist attacks. 
A majority (63%) said that it is a goal 
f the United States to “prevento
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owever, larger majorities perceive other, more perfidious, goals. About three-quarters (78%) also 
 
ubstantially—up 13 points from 
 the Middle East.”  Seventy-five 
tates.  Nearly half of those polled (47%) said they did not like the way their government 
andled these ties, including 25 percen  
 
mostly 
                                                
H
said that the United States wants to “ma
(definitely a goal, 59%).   
 
Perhaps most strikingly, an 
overwhelming majority believes that 
the United States has goals that are 
hostile to Islam itself. A remarkably 
high 86 percent agreed that it was a 
US goal to “weaken and divide the 
Islamic world” (“definitely” 70%, 
“probably” 16%).  Furthermore, this 
view appears to be growing 
intain control over the oil resources of the Middle East”
s
February 2007 when 73 percent said 
it was a US goal (definitely, 55%).1     
 
Three out of four even believe that it 
is a US goal to “spread Christianity 
in
percent said this was definitely 
(53%) or probably (22%) a US goal, while only 10 percent said that it was not.   
 
A plurality of Pakistanis disapproves of the way their government has handled its relations with the 
United S
Thinking now about US actions around the world, please tell 
me if you think the following are or are not US goals. 
To weaken and divide the Islamic world
US Goal: Weaken and Divide Islam
h t who said they “disapprove somewhat” and 22 percent who
e percent said they approved somewhat (29%) or stronglysaid they “disapprove strongly.”  Thirty-nin
(10%).   
 
Few Pakistanis think their 
government’s collaboration with US 
anti-terrorism efforts has helped their 
country.  Asked about “the 
cooperation in the last few years 
between Pakistan and the US on 
security and military matters,” only 
one in four (27%) said that it had 
brought any benefits to Pakistan.  
This includes 12 percent who said it 
had benefited both countries, 9 
percent who said that although it had 
“mostly benefited the United States” 
it had also helped Pakistan, and 6 
percent who said that it had “
 
1 This question was first asked by WorldPublicOpinion.org in a study conducted with the National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).  The February 2007 result cited above is for 
the urban portion of that sample, parallel to the urban sample in the present study.  WorldPublicOpinion.org’s 
report on the policy-related aspects of that study (“Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians, 
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Pakistan-US Security Cooperation
Do you think the cooperation in the last few years between 
Pakistan and the US on security and military matters has 
mostly benefited Pakistan, the United States, or both equally?
WPO 9/07
Mostly benefited Pakistan / Has benefited both equally 
6
44%29 9 6
Mostly benefited the United States / Has benefited neither
Those who said “the United States” were asked:                     
Do you think it has also helped Pakistan, or has it hurt 
Pakistan?
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enefited Pakistan.”  Nearly one third said US-Pakistani cooperation had actually hurt Pakistan 
  
out seven in 10 of all supporters—71 percent of 
usharraf and Sharif supporters and 69 percent of Bhutto supporters—also believe the United States 
definitely trying to weaken and divide Islam. 
mpathy for Taliban attacks on 
fghan police and troops.  Only one in three believe that the Pakistani government is seriously 
e 
ital interests of Pakistan.  Two thirds (67%) said they saw these tensions as either critical (40%) or 
 government receives good marks for how it has been handling relations 
ith Afghanistan.  Sixty percent approved of its performance (17% strongly) and only 25 percent 
mixed feelings.  A large 38 p ) 
how some sympathy for such 
 Thus nearly half (48%) 
iew them at least somewhat 
of the Taliban are colored by various 
b
(29%), and an additional 11 percent said it had benefited neither country. 
 
Supporters of all leaders were also united in their negative views of the United States and its motives.   
Majorities of all supporters said they did not trust the United States to act responsibly in the world, 
including 68 percent of Sharif supporters, 65 percent of Bhutto supporters and 55 percent of 
Musharraf supporters.  More than seven in 10 of all supporters view the US military presence in Asia 
as an important or critical threat to Pakistan—varying from 78 percent among Musharraf supporters 




9. Relations with Afghanistan 
Majorities see the tensions with Afghanistan as a threat to Pakistan’s interests and approve of 
the way Pakistan’s government has handled relations with its neighbor.  Views of the Taliban’s 
activities in Afghanistan are quite mixed: nearly half show at least some sympathy for their 
attacks on NATO troops, while one in three show some sy
A
trying to prevent the Taliban from operating in Afghanistan.  
 
A large majority of Pakistanis believe the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan threaten th
v
important (27%). Twenty-one percent said tensions with Afghanistan were not a threat to Pakistan.   
 
At the same time, Pakistan’s
w
disapproved (5% strongly). 
 
Views of the Taliban’s Activities 
 
Views of the Taliban’s activities are remarkably mixed and poorly defined.  When asked about the 
Taliban’s attacks on “Afghan troops and police in Afghanistan,” only 18 percent said they approved 
of such attacks (5% strongly).  But only
they had 
 29 percent disapproved (15% strongly) and 14 percent said 




When asked about the Taliban’s 
attacks on NATO troops, approval 
rose to 30 percent (12% strongly), 
disapproval dropped to 15 percent 
(9% strongly), and 18 percent 
expressed mixed feelings.  Once 
again a large 37 percent did not take 
a position. 
Taliban Attacks on NATO Troops
Thinking about attacks by the Taliban against NATO troops in 
Afghanistan, please tell me if you approve of them, 
disapprove of them, or have mixed feelings about them?  
WPO 9/07




Strongly disapprove / Somewhat disapprove
12 18
15%9 6
li  tt s   r s
Thinking about attacks by the Taliban against T  troops in 
fghanistan, please tell e if you approve of the , 
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Thus it appears that Pakistanis’ views 
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cks on NATO troops. 
 
 stop the Taliban. 
urand Line  
tan accepted the line as its international border, though subsequent Afghan governments 
ave not.   
e’s importance 
r Pakistan’s leadership, it seems to have almost no resonance in the general public.   
factors.  As discussed above, Pakistanis perceive US military presence in Afghanistan as a critical 
threat, thus potentially engendering some sympathy for their atta
 
Also, about a third of Pakistanis have some sympathy for Taliban.  Respondents were asked: 
“Thinking about the current Afghan government and the former Taliban government, which one do 
you think has had the best approach to governing Afghanistan?”  Thirty-four percent said the former 
Taliban government, and only 9 percent said the current Afghan government.  A quarter (24%) said 
“neither” and the rest declined to answer.    
 
Perception of Pakistan Government’s Efforts to Counter the Taliban   
 
When asked whether the Pakistan government was seriously trying to stop the Taliban from operating 
in Afghanistan or whether instead it was “allowing the Taliban to operate in Afghanistan,” only 33 
percent thought the government was seriously trying to stop the Taliban while  4 percent said the 
government was allowing the Taliban to operate. Another 3 percent volunteered that it was actually 
helping the Taliban.  This means that just 7 percent believed the government was enabling the Taliban 
in some way.  Another 25 percent 
said “it depends” or “neither,” 
implying they thought the 
government’s policy could not be 
summed up in either alternative. A 
third (36%) declined to answer. 
 
The same question was asked in 
Afghanistan in November 2006.  
Among Afghans, a very large 
majority—79 percent—thought 
Pakistan’s government was allowing 
the Taliban to operate in 
Afghanistan.  Only 15 percent 
thought Pakistan was seriously trying
Seriously trying   
to stop Taliban
Perceptions of Pakistan Gov’t and Taliban
Do you think the Pakistan government is seriously trying to 
stop the Taliban from operating in Afghanistan, or is it 








Seriously trying   
to stop Taliban
r ti s f ist  ’t  li
o you think the Pakistan govern ent is seriously trying to 
stop the Taliban fro  operating in fghanistan, or is it 
allo ing the Taliban to operate in fghanistan? 
PO 9/07
fghan perceptions, 11/06:







Only a small minority of Pakistanis know of the Durand Line and its disputed status as a boundary 
between the two countries.  Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of British colonial India, 




The current study asked: “Are you aware of the Durand Line, dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan?”  
Only 15 percent said yes, while 63 percent said no.  The 15 percent answering yes were then asked 
whether Afghanistan accepted the line as an international border.  Eight percent (of the whole sample) 




WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG / UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE                                                         21
       Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy,  
January 7, 2008             Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the US 
 
 weapons as threatening.  A majority 
say it is important but not 
ern (44% 
 
10. Ranking of Perceived Threats 
Asked to evaluate a series of possible threats to Pakistan’s vital interests, the Pakistani public 
rates US military presence in the region as a critical threat by the largest percentage.  Other 
threats regarded as critical by majorities include tensions with India and violence between 
Pakistani religious and ethnic groups.  Slightly fewer regard the activities of al Qaeda, local 
Taliban, and jihadist militants as critical, or the activities of ethnic nationalist movements.  
nly half see the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclearO
considers the rise of China to be no threat to Pakistan.   
 
In order to better understand Pakistani views of what could endanger their country, the study asked an 
extensive series of questions—17 in all—about “possible threats to the vital interests of Pakistan in 
the next ten years.”  The questions included international, regional and domestic threats.  Examining 
hem as a group throws light on how the Pakistani public viewt s the world around them and clarifies 
some of the attitudes discussed in other sections of this report. 
 
The US military presence in the 
region is rated as a critical threat by 
the largest percentage of respondents.  
Almost three in four—72 percent—
call the US military presence in Asia 
a critical threat; another 12 percent 
call it important but not critical.  
Almost as many Pakistanis view the 
US military presence in Afghanistan 
as threatening.  Sixty-eight percent 




Somewhat smaller majorities regard 
tensions with India and violence 
between Pakistani religious and 
ethnic groups as potential dangers.  
Fifty-three percent said “tensions 
between India and Pakistan” were a 
critical threat, and another 26 percent 
called them important.  The growth 
of “closer relations between India 
and the United States” were viewed 
similarly, with 53 percent seeing 
them as a critical threat and 24 
percent as important.  “India’s 
growing influence in the world” 
aised a little less concr
critical, 27% important).   
 
About the same numbers are 
concerned about “violence between 
different religious groups in 
Perceived Threats
Here is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Pakistan in 
the next ten years.  For each one, please select whether you see
this as a critical threat, important but not critical, or not an
important threat at all.
WPO 9/07
The US military presence in Asia
The US military presence in Afghanistan
Tensions between India and Pakistan 
Closer relations between India and the United States
Violence between different religious groups in Pakistan
Violence between different ethnic groups in Pakistan
Activities of al Qaeda
Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan
Activities of “Askari tanzeems” in Pakistan  
Activities of Islamist militants and local Taliban in FATA 
Activities of Mohajir nationalists in Pakistan
Activities of Sindhi nationalists in Pakistan
Activities of Baluch nationalists in Pakistan
Closer relations between India and China 
The possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons
















India’s growing influence in the world
44 27 18
The development of China as a world power
10 32 51
r i  r ts
ere is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Pakistan in 
the next ten years.  For each one, please select hether you see
this as a critical threat, i portant but not critical, or not an
i portant threat at all.
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India’s gro ing influence in the orld
44 27 18
The develop ent of China as a orld po er
10 32 51
    WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG / UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 22 
Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy,  




ritical, 25% important).   
ss 
evere than those presented by the United States, India, and the country’s own centrifugal forces.   
nd settled areas” are 
iewed as a critical threat by only 34 percent (26% important; 18% not a threat). 
was even less 
oncern about Sindhi nationalists (18% critical) and Baluch nationalists (17% critical). 
kistan.  Another 34 
ercent called it important, while 37 percent said it was not a threat to Pakistan.  
ions 
tween India and China,” with 23 percent calling this a critical threat and 37 percent important. 
 as beneficial for Pakistan, though only a 
lurality are positive about the idea of globalization.   
vironment 
2%).  In all of these areas, no more than 25 percent saw international trade as bad. 
een aware of the cultural aspect of 
lobalization and were more reluctant to endorse such changes. 
Pakistan” (51% critical, 26% important) and violence between different Pakistani ethnic groups (49
c
 
While many in the West perceive the activities of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other militant groups as 
Pakistan’s greatest problem, the Pakistani public regards these as meaningful threats, though le
s
 
A 41 percent plurality sees the “activities of al Qaeda” as a critical threat, and another 21 percent see 
them as important; only 14 percent says they are not a threat.  The related “tensions between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan” are a critical threat for 40 percent (27% important), but 21 percent says 
these tensions are not a threat.  Only 38 percent sees the activities of militant organizations (askari 
tanzeems) in Pakistan as a critical threat, while another 23 percent sees them as important (17% not a 
threat).  Likewise, “activities of Islamist militants and local Taliban in FATA a
v
 
The activities of ethnic separatist groups with nationalist ambitions cause relatively little concern to 
Pakistanis.  Only 22 percent saw Mohajir nationalists as a critical threat, with another 33 percent 
seeing them as important.  About a third (32%) said they were not a threat.  There 
c
 
Pakistanis show little concern about the possibility that neighboring Iran is developing nuclear 
weapons and may become the second Muslim nation, after Pakistan, to join the nuclear club of 
nations.  Only 16 percent viewed such a development as a critical threat to Pa
p
 
A majority sees the rise of China as no threat at all to Pakistan.  Fifty-one percent said that “the 
development of China as a world power” was not a threat.  Of the 42 percent who saw it as a threat, 
only 10 percent called it critical.  There was a little more anxiety over the growth of “closer relat
be
 
11. Trade and Globalization  
Large majorities endorse international trade and see it
p
 
Three in four Pakistanis view international trade positively.  By 77 percent to 13 percent, respondents 
said international trade was positive for the economy and 67 percent that it was positive for Pakistani 
companies.  Large majorities also see international trade as good for creating jobs in Pakistan (68%), 
job security for Pakistani workers (63%), and for their own standard of living (61%).  More modest 
majorities see international trade as good for “consumers like you” (57%), and for the en
(5
 
The Pakistani public’s response to the idea of globalization is more hesitant than their response to 
international trade.  Asked whether they believe that “globalization, especially the increasing 
connections of our economy with others around the world, is mostly good or mostly bad for 
Pakistan,” a 48 percent plurality said it was mostly good, 16 percent that it was mostly bad, and 36 
percent declined to answer.  Some respondents may have b
g
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ong track.  Nonetheless, a 
ff on the wrong track,” while only a quarter (26%) 
g at either the same speed as 
en 
ined growth in the last few years but are looking for a higher level of economic performance. 
lues and good 
nt to 
” (30% approve strongly).  Only 28 percent say they disapprove somewhat (21%) or strongly 
porta
 
                                                
 
12. Pakistan’s Economy  
wo thirds feel that Pakistan’s economy has gone off on the wrT
majority approves of how the government is handling the economy. 
 
Two thirds of Pakistanis are dissatisfied with how the country’s economy is performing.  Sixty-eight 
ercent said Pakistan’s economy “has … gone op
thought it was “moving in the right direction.”   
 
Further, a majority perceives (correctly) that India is experiencing faster growth.  When asked, “As 
compared to Pakistan, do you think India’s economy is growing much faster, a little faster, about the 
same speed, a little slower, or much slower,” a 56 percent majority said India was growing faster 
30% much faster).  Only 27 percent believed that India was growin(
Pakistan (11%), a little more slowly (7%), or much more slowly (9%). 
 
Despite this dissatisfaction, the public shows little inclination to blame Pakistan’s government for the 
country’s economic performance.  Fifty-five percent said they approved of how the government had 
handled the economy, either strongly (23%) or somewhat (32%).  About a third (34%) disapproved, 




Majorities express confidence in the educational system and approve of the government’s 
olicies.  Pakistanis put the highest priorities on teaching children religious vap
citizenship, followed by basic skills, problem-solving, and independent thinking.  
 
Foreign observers and policymakers have expressed concern about Pakistan’s educational system, 
saying that its curriculum has significant Islamist and Islamic content, espouses narrowly nationalist 
endencies and does not prepare the poor for better jobs.  However, a majority of Pakistanis wat
see their schools inculcate a religious and patriotic outlook along with the rest of the curriculum. 
 
A majority views the national public education system positively, with 58 percent saying they have a 
great deal (22%) or quite a lot (36%) of confidence.  Only about a third—36 percent—said they did 
not have very much (31%) confidence in education or that they had none at all (5%).  Almost two 




To better understand what the Pakistani public wants from public education, the study asked 
questions used originally by Matthew J. Nelson in his research on Pakistani parents’ preferences for 
heir children’s schools.2  All respondents were told to choose the most important and second most t
im nt of “five things different people sometimes say about what makes a school a good school”:   
A.  Some people say that a good school teaches students how to read and write.  In other 
words, good schools provide students with basic reading skills and basic math skills. 
 
2 Matthew J. Nelson, “Muslims, Markets, and the Meaning of a ‘Good’ Education in Pakistan,” Asian Survey, 
vol. 46, no. 5, pp. 699-720.  Nelson conducted a survey of parents in and around the city of Rawalpindi. 
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schools provide students with strong values and strong religious beliefs. 
s and think for 
 students to provide good jobs. 
E.  Some people say that good schools make sure that every student becomes a good citizen, 
 second choice), C—teaching problem-
olving and independent thinking (14% first choice, 19% second choice), and finally, D—preparing 
mbine religious and “worldly” content.  Work by C. 
hristine Fair and others finds that the Pakistani educational market is fast evolving new 
ld.  Religious scholars have discussed 
e need to reform the madrassah curriculum to ensure that the seminaries produce religious scholars 
hose religious training is relevant for a modern Muslim state. 
  
 
B.  Some people say that a good school is a school that creates good Muslims.  In other 
words, good 
C.  Some people say that good schools teach students how to solve problem
themselves. 
D.  Some people say that good schools prepare
showing respect for the laws of their country. 
 
Overall, B—teaching children to be good Muslims—was chosen most often, with 32 percent naming 
it as their first choice and 21 percent as their second choice.  Next most important was E—teaching 
good citizenship—chosen first by 17 percent and second by 26 percent.  These preferences were 
followed by A—teaching basic skills (25% first choice, 12%
s
students for good jobs (5% first choice, 15% second choice). 
 
This suggests that Pakistanis want education to co
C
opportunities that reflect this growing demand.   
 
While parents desire religious content in the public school curriculum, a large majority of Pakistanis 
also support the government’s plans for madrassah reform. This appears to reflect the longstanding 
debate about the madrassah curriculum, which has remained largely unchanged since the nineteenth 
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